Jack Paine (JP) and Alrik Thiem, Michael Baumgartner, and Damien Bol (TBB) provide diametrically opposed answers to the hotly debated question as to whether set-theory-based methods constitute a family of methods sui generis or whether not only set methods can be subsumed under the existing statistical framework, but also, if so, should be abandoned. I find TBB's argument convincing that due to their different mathematical foundations, these two families of methods cannot be directly translated, let alone unified into one. Notwithstanding this, it seems clear to me that work must continue on identifying conceptual similarities and differences, and to elaborate on each method's respective strengths and weaknesses. Because I mostly agree with TBB, I only briefly comment on some of their claims and then dedicate the rest of the text to JP.
Introduction
Jack Paine (JP; 2016) and Alrik Thiem, Michael Baumgartner, and Damien Bol (TBB; 2016) provide diametrically opposed answers to the hotly debated 1 Central European University, Budapest, Hungary question as to whether set-theory-based methods constitute a family of methods sui generis or whether not only can they be subsumed under the existing statistical framework, but also, if so, should be abandoned. I find TBB's argument convincing that due to their different mathematical foundations, these two families of methods cannot be directly translated, let alone unified into one. Notwithstanding this, it seems clear to me that work must continue on identifying conceptual similarities and differences, and to elaborate on each method's respective strengths and weaknesses. Because I mostly agree with TBB, I only briefly comment on some of their claims and then dedicate the rest of the text to JP.
Mathematical and Conceptual Perspectives
Overall, TBB provide a convincing and much-needed foundational statement on the mathematical (in)commensurateness between what they label configurational comparative methods (CCM) and regression analytic methods (RAM). I agree with their general message. My only quibble is that with their focus on mathematical foundations, potential conceptual similarities remain underappreciated. One side effect of this-and their somewhat surprising efforts at positioning themselves as neutral observers between the RAM and the CCM "camps," when, in fact, they are squarely rooted in the latter-is that they oversell their point that so far, not even CCM scholars fully understood CCM.
For instance, TBB criticize scholars such as Rihoux and De Meur (2009) or Schneider and Wagemann (2012) for treating the two implication operators ( ⇒ ⇐ and ) as conceptually different from the three fundamental operators (AND, OR, NOT), 1 because, in so doing, CCM scholars not only are allegedly unaware of the fact that the former operators can be defined in terms of the latter three, but also because they supposedly infuse the implication operators with causal properties (p. 9). Two things in response. First, TBB are not alone in understanding that neither regression nor Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) can "conclusively identify causality" (n. 12). A closer reading of the CCM literature reveals that most agree that finding a set relation alone is not enough to postulate a cause, a theme I get back to below. Second, TBB's point that the non-fundamental implication operators can be expressed by the three fundamental operators, while mathematically correct, is oddly removed from the whole use and purpose of CCM. Scholars choose this method to find meaningful super-and/or subsets of the phenomenon to be explained. It is unclear why, from this research-practical perspective, the status of the three fundamental logical operators should be seen as no different from the implication operators. Because this does not make much sense beyond mathematical formalism, it is no surprise that all of the leading books on CCM (e.g., Ragin, 2008, or Goertz and Mahoney, 2012) conceptually distinguish between logical operators and implications. These authors do not commit "glaring errors" (p. 3), but take a meaningful social science perspective on CCM.
There are further instances in which TBB unnecessarily distract the reader from their otherwise convincing point by attributing errors to scholars where there are none. For example, TBB criticize Schneider and Wagemann (2012) for not distinguishing enough between a "set-theoretic and logical interpretation" (p. 7f.), 2 just to continue by saying that "[f]rom a conceptual perspective, mixing interpretations of a Boolean algebra is unproblematic . . ." (p. 8). So we seem to agree here. TBB also suggest that Schneider and Wagemann (2012) misunderstand fundamental mathematical difference between RAM and CCM because they allegedly downplay the difference between condition and outcome, on one hand, and dependent and independent variable to a mere question of terminology (p. 8), on the other. This misrepresents what they actually write: "Regarding terminology, we shall use 'condition' and 'outcome' for what in other research contexts are often referred to as 'independent variable' and 'dependent variable'" (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012, p. 55) . Clearly, what is meant here is conceptual similarity: Conditions and independent variables are the explanans, and outcome and dependent variable are the explanandum. Even if TBB might think otherwise, probably all CCM researchers are fully aware that sets are not variables and that implications are not correlations. Along these lines, it seems wrong to think that scholars such as Mahoney (2008) fail to comprehend the difference between interactions and intersections or that Grofman and Schneider (2009) claim that logistic regression can or should be used to mimic QCA. Here is what Grofman and Schneider (2009) write on the page quoted by TBB: "These facts might lead us to think that we could substitute binary logistic analyses for QCA, but that would be erroneous" (p. 669). And further ". . . if we do decide to use binary logistic methods to mimic QCA, we would add three strong notes of caution" (p. 669). None of the cautions then listed by Grofman and Schneider in 2009 contradict anything that TBB write in 2015.
In sum, TBB's main argument is important and seems correct to me: There are fundamental and unbridgeable mathematical differences between CCM and RAM. Their unwarranted allegations against fellow scholars only obfuscate their main mathematical point and risk distracting from the much-needed debate on the conceptual similarities and differences between RAM and CCM.
Turning Back the Wheel
JP raises a series of issues, all meant to show that social science approaches making use of the notions of sets and set theory (henceforth STM)-such as QCA or specific forms of process tracing-not only are nothing new under the sky but also are inferior to existing quantitative techniques. Even if not (yet) recognized by STM scholars, so JP's argument, many, if not most features of STM research can either be subsumed under quantitative practices or are incompatible with current norms and thus inherently flawed. Because I am sympathetic to the general goal of clarifying methodological similarities and differences and because I think that the ongoing broader debate on this theme has already triggered some positive developments, I deem it important to respond to JP's core arguments, for I think they are leading in a wrong direction.
JP offers three main points. First, to infer set relations of necessity and sufficiency, all four cells in a 2 × 2 table must be taken into account. I show that this is precisely what STM scholars already do and that the procedure proposed by JP, rather than an improvement, is actually a step back in this direction. Second, going beyond 2 × 2 tables, JP argues that more complex relations can (and, it seems, should) be modeled with complex interaction terms. I point out that JP's argument not only is at odds with recent methodological contributions, the most noteworthy being TBB (2016). It is also actually a case in point for the difference rather than similarity between QCA and interactive regression models. Third, JP cogently shows that deterministic hypotheses set a high bar for causal inference. Far from denying this point, I argue that it is not confined to STM but affects any (qualitative) research making (implicit) deterministic claims.
Using All Four Cells? Yes, Of Course
According to JP, the empirical analysis of hypotheses on set relations ". . . requires analyzing cases that exhibit variation on both the causal conditions and the outcome-which demonstrates a crucial similarity to quantitative research" (p. 6) and which, allegedly, runs counter to STM practice. Here, JP is beating a straw man. STM scholars already embrace the idea of using information from all four cells for various analytic purposes. In the following, I leave aside the obvious mathematical argument that all existing STM formulas for assessing set relations use information from all cells-just that 0,0 cases (cases with value 0 in both X and Y) enter these formulas with value 0 in both the numerator and denominator. I also just mention in passing (and below) that new writings on set-theoretic multi-method research explicitly call for selecting 0,0 cases for process tracing when the goal is to draw causal inference. Instead, here I focus on recently developed STM formulas that are capable of analyzing set relations in the presence of skewed sets, a situation that is at the core of JP's concern. His proposal for a new formula is an attempt to reinvent the wheel, which actually is turning that wheel back, for it produces misleading results where the STM procedure can perfectly distinguish between empirically meaningful and not meaningful set relations.
Key to the following discussion is that a meaningful evaluation of a set relation requires asking two distinct questions that must be answered in the following order. First, is X a superset 3 of Y? In the STM literature, this is called the consistency test and for crisp sets (but not fuzzy sets) requires looking at only the two cells in which Y is present. Importantly, though, the analysis does not stop here. If the answer is yes, then, and only then, the second question is: Is X a relevant necessary condition for Y? No set-relational assessment is complete without this second step, for X could be a trivial superset of Y. Schneider and Wagemann (2012, p. 233ff .) point out that there are two sources of trivialness: either the condition set X is much bigger than outcome set Y and/or X is much bigger than  X . In particular, the latter is related to what they call "skewed sets," that is, most cases are members of X. They propose the Relevance of Necessity (RoN) formula to capture both potential sources of trivialness. If STM scholars apply RoN to those conditions that have passed their consistency test, then, in fact, STM scholars rely on information from all four cells. I leave aside the question why JP, despite recognizing this fact (p. 13 and n. 9), puts so much emphasis on claiming the opposite. Instead, I focus on whether the formula proposed by JP (Formula 6), which uses all four cells, has any added value over existing STM procedures. 4 The crucial difference between JP's formula and STM practice is not which cells are used-both use all cells-but the (non-)sequence in which that information is used. While STM perform two different analytic steps gauging consistency and relevance, JP conflates these two into one. In some sense, this is akin to mixing into one parameter the statistical significance and the strength of an association. Just as nobody should do that in statistics, nobody in STM would and should mix assessments of consistency and relevance. To see the problematic consequences of this conflation, I compare JP and STM using JP's own (hypothetical) examples. 5 Tables 2 to 4 of JP's article display three different scenarios. The major point JP seeks to make is that in Table 2 , where condition set F is skewed, STM scholars would erroneously identify F as necessary for A because the consistency score is high (.91). In contrast, his "consistency" 6 score is low, thus dismissing the claim F A ⇐ . 7 What JP fails to mention is that STM scholars do not stop at calculating consistency, but, if consistency is high enough, also produce the RoN score. For Table 2 , RoN is a minuscule .09. 8 Based on this, no STM scholar in his right mind would claim that F A ⇐ , for that would be a trivial claim. 9 Thus, contrary to JP's assertion, the STM approach of first calculating consistency and then RoN does take care of the analytic pitfalls that emerge when confronted with skewed sets.
In his section "All Four Cells: Consistency or Triviality," JP explicitly discusses the RoN formula but tries to dismiss it by arguing that this formula is about set-theoretic consistency, not relevance. To this, he adds that even if it were reflecting relevance, still all four cells would need to be considered, a point that STM scholars have no issue with.
For illustration, JP argues that STM scholars would foolishly have to conclude that not-being Babe Ruth (  X ) is necessary for hitting a home run (Y). 10 His argument that a skewed set such as  X and, thus, RoN are an issue of consistency rather than relevance rests on the claim that the contrapositive to
Y ⇒ is inconsistent. This argument seems flawed to me. JP does not apply RoN to his example. If one does-as I will do below-one sees that STM would not make the obviously nonsensical claim that not-being Babe Ruth is a necessary condition for hitting home runs, simply because does not pass the RoN test. And because STM would not make that statement of necessity, there is no point in checking the contrapositive of a non-statement.
JP not only claims that STM would get it wrong when sets, such as the set of non-Babe Ruth baseball players, are skewed, but also that his formula is superior in not falling victim to weird claims based on skewed sets. Let us see if this is the case. In 1927, Babe Ruth hit a record of 60 home runs out of 192 hits. In the same season, there were around 14,352 hits in the entire league (made by the top 100 players) out of which around 654 were home runs and 13,698 were not (http://espn.go.com/mlb/history). Table 1 summarizes this information. Table 2 lists the scores obtained from JP's and the STM formulas and indicates whether, based on these scores, JP or STM scholars, respectively, would conclude that the set relation under investigation is meaningful. In addition to testing whether not-being Babe Ruth (  X ) passes the test of being a meaningful necessary condition for hitting a home run (Y), Table 2 displays all possible relations of necessity and sufficiency between X and  X and Y and  Y , respectively.
First, not only JP but also STM would rule out the claim  X Y ⇐ , the latter because RoN is way too low. Second, none of the other three possible necessity relations would pass the STM test of a meaningful relation. 11 It is not quite clear if the same can be said of JP's formula. For the arguably absurd claim that Table  2 seems to consider as a threshold for rejecting a necessity hypothesis. There is, thus, reason to believe that researchers using JP's formula would come to conclude that being Babe Ruth was necessary for hitting a home run.
A third insight from Table 2 is that although STM scholars distinguish between necessity and sufficiency, JP does not offer a separate formula for sufficiency. He, instead, argues that fully saturated regression models produce all information needed for ". . . computing necessary/sufficient condition consistency and coverage scores . . ." (p. 16f.). Applied to the bivariate example of Babe Ruth hitting home runs, this idea yields a coefficient of .27, thus indicating "inconsistency" in JP's terminology. The problem, though, is that this parameter cannot distinguish between the four possible sufficiency relations and therefore yields identical values for all of them. This is problematic because as soon as there is inconsistency in the data, there must be a difference as to what is necessary and what is sufficient for an outcome. STM scholars, in contrast, apply different formulas and, thus, adequately capture all four possible sufficiency relations. 12 Applying these tools, STM scholars would find that there is non-fully consistent empirical support for the claim that not-being Babe Ruth is sufficient for not hitting a home run. 13 Because the negation of a set is often difficult to interpret, STM scholars would probably look at those 594 cases in Table 1 that contradict this claim to identify missing INUS (Insufficient but Necessary part of a condition that is itself Unnecessary but Sufficient for the result) conditions that better (i.e., more consistently) describe the type of players that failed to hit a home run in season 1927.
Mimicking QCA With Regression? Not Really
JP argues that a fully saturated interactive regression model ". . . provides all the information needed to calculate necessary and sufficient condition consistency and coverage scores for any complex combination of conditions" (p. 15). This claim is at odds with TBB (2015), who provide convincing mathematical arguments that set relations cannot be subsumed under a correlational analytic framework because of the fundamentally different axiomatic systems of Boolean algebra and linear algebra. JP's argument is also not in line with Braumoeller's (2014) elucidating treatment of the differences between various forms of interactions, of which regression interaction terms and STM intersections are two different types. There seem to be several ways in which the incompatibility between regression interactions and STM conjunctions expresses itself. Most importantly, whereas JP claims to be able to replicate a QCA with a fully saturated regression model, he does not explain how that model would take into account several core features of STM, in general, and QCA, in particular. No distinction is made between either necessity or sufficiency, nor between explaining the outcome versus explaining the non-outcome. Furthermore, the regression framework proposed by JP is silent on how to handle limited diversity, whereas QCA has developed a sophisticated literature and suggestions on this omnipresent phenomenon in empirical social research. 14 Last but not least, QCA can handle fuzzy sets, multi-value sets, and generalized sets (Thiem, 2013) . It is unclear how JP's saturated regression framework (and his necessity formula for that matter) can work beyond dichotomies. In light of all this, I believe that the argument put forward by JP is not strong enough to convince readers that similarities between regression and STM dominate their differences and that the former can substitute the latter.
Determinism, Counterfactuals, Causation
I find JP's argument convincing according to which even fully consistent empirical information does not provide conclusive support for the claim that the relation is deterministic. Yet, this is true not only for STM but also for any qualitative research, set-theory based or not. What is more, in discussing Mahoney's (2010) research on post-colonial Latin America, JP sends a mixed message. On one hand, it reads as if deterministic hypotheses are inherently impossible to sustain. On the other hand, JP concludes this section by writing that ". . . claims of necessity and sufficiency require scrutinizing additional scope conditions about hypothetical possibilities that are not observed among the cases under inquiry, a topic STCM scholars have not addressed" (p. 25). Rather than an unsurmountable task, this sounds like a very useful suggestion for improving not only STM research but also any (qualitative) research that makes (implicit) deterministic claims. One might even say that the quest for refining (deterministic) claims by specifying both scope conditions (e.g., Goertz & Mahoney, 2012, p. 205ff.) and the very nature of a case (e.g., Ragin & Becker, 1992 ) is part and parcel of any social science progress.
I also fully agree with JP that both quantitative and STM scholars face the challenge of how to move from associations (correlations or set relations) to causation. JP rightly attributes a crucial role to counterfactuals for causal inference. As a matter of fact, ongoing research on STM (e.g., Baumgartner, 2015) , in general, and on set-theoretic multi-method research (e.g., , 2014 , in particular, postulates counterfactuals and "difference making" as important ingredients for causal inference also in STM-based research, despite its focus on asymmetric set relations. This is important to mention because from this follow two crucial similarities between STM and quantitative research, which JP (and TBB) leave unexplored. First, STM can be made compatible with the potential outcomes framework. Second, in STM, within-case analysis of 0,0 cases is crucial for causal inference, if and when they are matched with 1,1 cases for comparative process tracing. 15
Similarities and Differences-At Which Level?
TBB's and JP's goal-to identify similarities and differences-between quantitative methods and STM is an important one. In a sense, the answer to this question depends on which level of generality it is posed and how one defines similarities and differences. TBB detect important mathematical differences. As I argued, although such incommensurateness does not rule out any similarities at other levels, JP's claims of similarity and, ultimately, superiority of RAM, are not convincing. STM scholars already use all four cellsso they are more similar than portrayed by him-but they do so in a distinctively different manner than proposed by JP-hence, they are more different than he argues. Regression models do not capture the essence of what STM scholars are looking for in their data, and there are good arguments why this cannot be different. And although STM faces the challenge of moving from association to causation, this challenge is neither unique, nor all that different for STM than for any other empirical method using observational data.
One promising avenue for further exploring similarities seems to be the common definition of a cause as a difference maker, the related use of counterfactuals, and the role of process tracing in 0,0 cases for causal inference. Just as JP, I do not think that STM breaks genuinely new inferential ground (p. 3), nor does it have to. What I doubt is that from this, it must follow that STM is redundant, inferior to, and subsumable under existing quantitative approaches. STM scholars do propose different tools for similar goals, and they seem to work pretty well for what they are intended to do.
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Notes
9. Table 2 is also a good illustration for the two sources of trivialness. The still more common "coverage" formula (Ragin, 2008 ) yields a rather high value (.5) because F is not too much bigger than A. Instead, trivialness is largely driven by the fact that F is so much bigger than  F, thus yielding a low RoN score. 10. For the uninitiated (non-U.S.) reader, Babe Ruth was a legendary American baseball player, playing for more than 20 years, famous for, among other things, the many home runs he hit. 11. Note that although for the claim   X Y ⇐ , the standard STM coverage score is high, RoN is low, thus nicely illustrating the two different sources of trivialness. 12. Proportional Reduction in Inconsistency (PRI) can be seen as a functional equivalent of RoN in the analysis of sufficiency and essentially expresses how much a given X is not only a subset of Y but also  Y . See Schneider and Wagemann (2012, chap. 9 .2) for a more general treatment of skewed sets beyond the analysis of necessity. 13. Note that while STM detect empirical support for   X Y ⇒ , they do not for the contrapositive X Y ⇐ . 14. The discussion triggered by King and Zeng (2007) comes closest to addressing the problem in the regression framework, but there seems to be no agreement on its solution, nor even that it actually is a (big) problem. 15. For more reasons why to choose 0,0 cells, see Mahoney and Goertz (2004) , Mikkelsen (2015) .
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